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Organic Crisis and ›Postneoliberal‹ Tendencies
Meanwhile, over 20 years after Reagan and Thatcher,
it is broadly acknowledged that the period of Fordism
is over and that new modes of production and modes
of life have developed. Depending on the theoretical
approach, these developments have been characterised
as a ›new production regime‹ (Dörre), a new financial
market-driven regime of accumulation or even a finan-
cial market capitalism (Aglietta, Chesnais), a new post-
Fordist period (Hirsch), a global empire (Hardt/Negri)
or transnational high-tech capitalism (Haug) that is sub-
stantially shaped by neoliberalism (Harvey). In the final
chapter of Neoliberalismus – Hochtechnologie – Hege-
monie, first published in 2004, in which I tried to
explain this constellation, I already concluded: “There
are increasing signs of an organic crisis of neoliberalism
... these are foreshadows of ›post-neoliberalism‹.“ And
indeed: for some time now, indications of a looming cri-
sis are increasing in various areas, there are cumulations
and condensations of the various crises with shorter
intervals, not at the margins of the internal and external
peripheries, but in the centres of neoliberal capitalism –
and this is particularly shown by the turbulent develop-
ments in the course of the world economic and finan-
cial crisis (cf. Candeias 2009).
These developments indicate “incurable contradictions“
(Gramsci, Prison Notebook 7, 1557) in the structure of
society, which lead to contradictions and blockages
within the ruling bloc in power. By no means could neo-
liberalism be understood as a purely destructive force
(Bourdieu) or “conservative restoration“ (Bischoff et al.
1998). Marx had always emphasised the contradictory
amalgamation of destructive and productive forces in
capitalist development. Even the neoliberal manage-
ment of the transition to a transnational mode of pro-
duction based on information technologies – neolibera-
lism's main function simultaneously promoting
societiatal change and serving as hegemonic base – pro-
ductive forces were still unleashed: the withdrawal of an
extreme (Taylorist) division of labour in production
freed workers from monotony, new forms of production
could integrate their knowledge, computerisation and
automation could relieve the burden of hard physi-
cal work. The internationalisation culture, goods and
consumption dissolved national narrow-mindedness,
de-nationalisation dissolved state paternalism. For
instance, following demands by the women's move-
ment, neoliberalism ›liberated‹ housewives from patri-
archal family relations and forced them into the labour
market. However, since the end of World War II, the
fruits produced by these forces were and are distributed
more unequally than ever before. Neoliberalism has
already lost its progressive and propellent social func-
tion in managing the transition to the transnational
mode of production. This mode of production hardly
offers sufficient possibilities for expansion and develop-
ment under neoliberal conditions to meet both the needs
of accumulation and social needs of the population to
improve their situation. The potentials are there but their
realisation seems to be blocked. 
The current power block can no longer counter the erup-
ting signs of crises and their complex entanglement with
productive solutions that could take up the interests of
the subaltern and thus restore the active consensus to the
neoliberal project: we are facing the most far-reaching
financial and economic crisis since the 1930s, closely
linked to food and energy crises, and to the destruction
of employment, which means further aggravating of the
precarisation of working and living conditions that
thrusts large parts of society into soaring insecurity and
increasingly leads to revolt at the external and internal
peripheries among those most affected. Protest and resi-
stance is forming at all levels, still fragmented and with-
out clear direction, but periodically rising. 
Already, the ecological crisis is apparent in everyday
life, not only in form of catastrophes  threatening the
lives of millions of people through storms, droughts,
and floods but also in form of massive destruction of
capital. Especially in the peripheries, mainly in South
America, popular majorities and governments have
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2rejected neoliberalism, and are looking for new ways
of ensuring a more autonomous development. The so-
called Washington Consensus and its institutions, but
also the Good Governance approaches are openly dis-
missed by an increasing number of states from the glo-
bal South – those who can afford it, pay their debts
before they are due and break free from IMF influence.
This entails global political and economical shifts in the
social power relations, and new capitalist centres are
developing with the so-called BRIC and Gulf States. On
the other hand, increasing sectors of the population in
the old centres are turning away from parties and gover-
nments, some even from formal democracy itself. This
has lead to a constant crisis of representation that has
remained unresolved for some time. Internationally, the
limits of force- fully and violently securing neoliberal
globalisation have become clear for some time. The US
as the global monopolist of force is so overburdened
that its difficulties in carrying out this task in the inte-
rest of the transnational bloc and in its own interests, led
to Bush's unilateralism, destroying the ›soft power‹ of
the so-called American way of life. The defeat in Iraq is
only the most obvious example for the imperial over-
strech. Even within the states, reinforcement of securiti-
sation deployments, massive policing and prisonfare
(Wacquant) is proving insufficient in maintaining social
order, let alone organising the consent of the subalterns. 
Economically, the most problematic effect for the ruling
power bloc may be that the accumulation on an expan-
ded scale is no longer guaranteed: a study by the Bank
for International Settlements (BIS) shows that growth
was lower after each crisis than following the previous
crisis. In the US, for instance, the level of economic
power achieved before the New Economy crisis 2001,
was not reached again until 2006. The BIS calls this the
“myth of economic recovery“: “If economic performan-
ce declines, it tends to remain far below its previous
level after recovery“ (Cerra/Saxena 2007, 16). Economic
recovery occurred more slowly, especially in countries
with a strong liberalisation of capital transactions and
financial markets. After each financial crisis, long peri-
ods of recovery are to be expected, often taking too long
to return to the previous level before the next crisis hits.
This myth means that increasing profits can only be
achieved by constant redistribution of the surplus value at
the expense of the wage-earners, the state and nationally
or regionally restricted capital. Ever growing areas of
socially necessary work, public infrastructure, and social
services dry up. Whereas over-accumulation cannot be
reduced substancially, and new areas of investment are
opened up insufficiently, the crisis of social reproduction
deepens in a way as to endanger the foundations of capi-
talist accumulation itself (lack of infrastructure, qualifi-
cations, cohesion, and prospects for profit, etc.). 
Because of the interaction and entanglement of severe
crises this appears to be a structural or organic crisis.
The reserves of still dominant neoliberalism as the orga-
nising ideology in the transition to a transnational mode
of production based on information technology are
exhausted – neither a new accumulation stimulus nor a
new consensus in society can be expected from it. Its
institutions will continue to have effects (similarly to
the end of Fordism), their position is now only “ruling”,
still dominant, but not “leading“ (Gramsci, PN 2, 354)
anymore. Just as in the crisis of Fordism after 1968,
various crises moments are cumulating that are counte-
red by an intensification of the old regulation mecha-
nisms, and at the same time, something new is emer-
ging: Keynesianism only fully evolved in the moment
of crisis while neoliberals already prepared the end of
“embedded liberalism“ and its institutions (the regimes
of fixed exchange rates, capital controls, etc.), cancel-
ling the old class compromise. Similarly, the effects of
more than 30 years of liberalisation and redistribution
from ›below‹ to ›above‹ are being countered by an
intensification of this redistribution through rescuing
banks and socialising debts and risks. At the same time,
a new state interventionism appears to be emerging wit-
hin the management of the crisis. This is already ope-
ning up the conflict on ›post-neoliberal‹ forms of regu-
lation, since crisis management within neoliberalism is
reaching its limits. Even if the ruling power bloc keeps
its government positions, it is threatened with the loss of
cultural hegemony which is more than a passive con-
sensus and consumerism. The contradictions within the
power bloc are deepening, such that a reconfiguration is
likely and possibilities for intervention by the left may
appear. Of course, overcoming neoliberalism will glo-
bally be characterised by fierce social struggles. Howe-
ver, it would be imprudent to rely on the collapse of
neoliberalism and to assume that the crisis will make
things easy for the left. Projects, tendencies, scenarios
are being developed from different sides in order to
reconstitute and/or develop bourgeois capitalist rule. At
the same time, the following tendencies within neolibe-
ralism but reaching beyond are being developed simul-
taneously:
New State Interventionism
The financial crisis brought an end to deregulation and
liberalisation and gives state intervention a different
direction and meaning. Because of the threatening
›meltdown‹ of the financial system, neoliberal dogmas
are abandoned by the dozens: inflation of money supp-
ly, nationalisation of banks, state and central bank cre-
dits without guarantees, anti-cyclical stimulus packages,
abolishing all public borrowing limits including the ever
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strict controls, ceilings for CEO payments and interven-
tions into bonus systems, but also in investment and cre-
dit policies, sometimes partial government ownership of
corporations, etc. For neoliberals of conviction, this
constitutes socialism. In actual fact, it can more appro-
priately be seen as the attempt of the ›ideal universal
capitalist‹, the state, to save capitalism. In the words of
the leading conservative German newspaper FAZ: “The
state rescues capitalism“ (5 Oct. 2008, 38f) – not quite
voluntarily, more likely by necessity due to the pressure
of the markets, capital and the fear of losing legitimati-
on. This state interventionism no longer functions in the
sense of neoliberal dynamisation of markets but in the
good old fashioned way of flexible liberal Keynesia-
nism which compensates market failure, but continues
to foster the redistribution and appropriation of surplus
value to the benefit of the wealthy (by socialising debts
and risks), and at the same time directly intervening in
the investment and accumulation strategies of capital,
especially when the state becomes (the main) sharehol-
der. The conflict over the role of state intervention is in
full swing: the government – especially in Germany – is
undecided on whether the more active role of the state
should be applied temporarily or permanently; the for-
ces involved are pushing in varying directions. It is que-
stionable, for instance, whether the far-reaching natio-
nalisations in the US banking and insurance sector can
actually be reversed in mid-term. But so far, long-term
concepts for state-run financial institutes do not exist
yet.
Relegitimisation of Neoliberalism or
a Bretton Woods II 
Conflicts over the future are especially evident in the
search for new forms of regulating the global financial
system: restorative forces that wish to use the state to
reinstall the previous order, and want to plunder its
finances, are intertwined with reformist initiatives that
clearly go beyond the status quo ante. This simulta-
neously reveals the attempt to re-legitimize neoliberal
global financial markets and their regulative contain-
ment. The US, as main originator of the crisis, but also
the G7/G8, have lost the legitimacy to create a new glo-
bal financial structure. Consequently, the group of those
involved needs to be expanded to the G20. Even if they
still lack democratic legitimacy (for instance, through
the UN), this represents considerable progress compa-
red to the small group of G7/G8: after all, the G20 not
only provide nearly 90 per cent of global economic per-
formance, but they constitute 63 per cent of world popu-
lation and about 50 per cent of the world's poor. It seems
to be clear that after this disaster, the US on its own can
no longer dominate the rules of the game. Economical-
ly, the model of high consumption rates, financed
through debt by massive capital imports from all over
the world cannot be reinstated (just as unlikely as the
German or Chinese model with its unbalanced focus on
export growth and neglect of domestic demand). The
Washington Consensus for free capital transactions as in
the US paradigm has been discredited. The Europeans,
on the other hand, are divided: The Germans especially
are still mostly following neoliberal concepts, whereas
the French advocate authoritarian state intervention.
Additionally, the new capitalist centres of China, India,
Brazil and the Arab oil states want to have their say – in
various ways, they all advocate open but controlled
financial markets. The West at last acknowledges the
altered economic and political global power relations by
officially involving these states. Even if the decisions of
the G20 have so far been slight, and it is still unclear as
to what extent there will be a rupture with neolibera-
lism, the most extensive re-regulations over the last 30
years lie ahead. Obama wants to have a leading role in
this process – whether this will actually be the case is
unclear. Because of the uncertainties of the world eco-
nomic crisis, we can expect that pressure will further
promote shifts towards re-regulation which has been
only small so far, as well as increase the contradictions
between the states and capital groups involved. Especi-
ally the BRIC states – in alliance with the IMF – are try-
ing to challenge the US-Dollar as world currency in
search of a new global monetary regime. Thereby the
IMF has achieved re-legitimisation and is looking for a
new role. Especially the so-called UN-based Stiglitz-
Commission has elaborated far reaching proposals for
re-regulation. The transnational fractions of capital feel
challenged and have founded the B20 as an attempt to
reclaim a leading role in solving the crisis and forming
the post-crisis order. Similar struggles around reinsta-
ting neoliberalism with only small concessions and
minimal political changes (predominant in Germany,
for instance) versus far-reaching attempts of re-regulati-
on can be observed on the national level as well. If they
succeed in re-legitimizing and restoring neoliberalism
with only small adjustments and regulations (even only
temporarily), and in blocking a far-reaching new con-
struction of the global economic and financial relations,
of production and consumption, then the crisis will only
be made worse.
New Public Deal
A New Public Deal is reacting to different processes of
crises even beyond the financial sector: Certain groups
around president Obama are trying to ameliorate the
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sion of the public sphere, especially with new invest-
ment programmes in public infrastructure, reforms in
education and health systems and with the creation of
new jobs in those sectors. Thus they are simultaneously
trying to tackle the reproduction and employment crisis
(that are particularly severe in the US), as well as to
offer a new consensus to the subalterns. The strengt-
hening of the state, tax reforms and a slight redistributi-
on towards those below are supposed to contain discon-
tent and even revolts, to foster the hope for change and
to secure consent. Additionally, the measures serve
to improve economic conditions with infrastructure, re-
qualification and possibilities for profit through Private-
Public-Partnerships (so-called PPPs where the state acts
as a financier and owner, private investors manage con-
struction and operation, and the state guarantees their
profits). It is not clear who might be the agency for such
a project. Is this only about a new conjuncture of neoli-
beralism with only slight adjustments and concessions
or is it an element of the ›post-neoliberal‹ project (as the
term New Deal seems to imply)? Will investment be
sufficient to also absorb the over-accumulation conside-
ring the lack of social pressure from the left? The
struggles around the health system reform (especially
around a state-run health system) have not been encou-
raging so far. But there is some consent to the idea, that
the state has to play a different role than in the last 30
years and provide better basic public infrastructure.
Green New Deal 
The general re-orientation of investment towards ener-
gy efficiency and reduction of CO2-emissions would be
the necessary technological and accumulation base to
create millions of jobs and to construct a new consensus
in society – a ›Green New Deal‹ that is already being
strongly advocated as an answer to the financial and
economic crisis, as well as the crises of reproduction,
employment and the ecological crisis – and thereby to
re-legitimize the free market economy (see details in
Candeias/Kuhn 2008). Among others this project was
proposed by the Green New Deal Group as a solution
to a “triple crisis“, a “combination of credit-driven
financial crisis, accelerated climate change and increa-
sing energy prices in view of peak oil“. This group is an
alliance of journalists, party and NGO functionaries.1
These ideas are driven by the Stern Report on
climate change 2006, by the analyses of the IPCC and
transnational research groups as well as the popular
activities of Nobel Prize winner Al Gore. Support comes
from the European Green Parties – the German Greens
decided at their party convention in November 2008 to
call for a Green New Deal to overcome the financial cri-
sis (for a critique of the concept, see Candeias 2007),
and also from large NGOs such as the WWF or Friends
of the Earth, transnational networks of ecological scien-
tists and from the UN. Even Obama has appointed
known advocates of ecological change to the positions
of Secretary of Energy, Administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency and the Chair of the Council
on Environmental Quality in the White House. This is
backed by capital groups such as internet and IT com-
panies (Google, MySpace or Microsoft that are among
the main advisers to the new President on these que-
stions), pharmaceutical, genetic engineering and bio-
technology corporations, the renewable energy sector
(including the ›green‹ spin-offs of the large energy
providers and engineering corporations), the large insu-
rance companies, car manufacturers such as Toyota and
Renault, nanotechnology and chemical corporations
such as BASF (who are developing new, light and ener-
gy-efficient materials), even oil corporations such as BP
(who have renamed themselves to ›Beyond Petrol‹) as
well as venture-capital funds or the small but growing
sector of ethical investment houses (including large
pension funds).2
A Green New Deal could mean more than an ecologi-
cally-conscious, short-term programme to contain the
crisis. Moreover, it could mean a state initiated and mas-
sively state subsidised transformation to an ›ecological‹
mode of production, that opens new areas for accumu-
lation of capital, such as the further commodification of
1 However, the slogan Green New Deal was already coined more
than 15 years ago in West-Germany for the attempt “to achieve a
›sustainable‹ economic expansion without abolishing capitalist
accumulation as such [...]“ (Brüggen in HKWM 5, 1063). At the
beginning of the 1990s, the German Green Party, together with the
social-ecological wing of the SPD, hoped to develop a reformist
solution strategy for the ecological crisis which was already visi-
ble at the time, in a way that could additionally provide a founda-
tion for a “new alliance between the distribution-oriented workers'
movement and the more ›postmaterial‹ interests of the middle
classes“ (ibid., 1064). Apart from ecological investment program-
mes and efficiency increases, the main aspects of those drafts of a
Green New Deal were proposals criticizing growth with a radical
reduction of working time. Today's drafts mostly neglect such
approaches and concentrate on strategies for capitalizing ecologi-
cal resources. This would open new spheres for accumulation and
increase resource efficiency.
2 The financial and economic crisis does indeed temporarily result
in a reduction in emissions and the consumption of resources and
oil – more effectively than the Kyoto protocol and emission tra-
ding, but at the same time it blocks ecological modernisation
through lack of credit, cancelled initial public offerings on the
stock market and withdrawal of investments in environmental
technologies. For instance Toyota cancelled the construction of a
factory for hybrid cars in the US, and the shares in the sector of
renewable energies dropped even faster than for the stock market
as a whole – mainly because of the governments' refusal to tighten
environmental regulations and due to the relapse into classical
industrial and growth policies. Many companies in the field of
solar energy are in a big trouble, but the governments are rescuing
only banks and the car industries.
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technologies to improve efficiency in production and
energy utilities; new investment and market outlets in
emission trading or in ecological consumption (organic
food, ecological construction, green cars, etc.). The
market for investment in low emission energies and
green technologies promises to grow to several trillion
dollars. 
In effect all these strategies turn nature and the environ-
ment into a commodity, thereby restricting the possibi-
lities for solving the ecological crisis.3 Consequently,
green capitalism cannot be the solution to the ecological
crisis, instead, it is a procedure to restore expanded
capitalist accumulation and hegemony by involving
progressive oppositional groups and interests of the sub-
altern. Changing the whole structure of production, the
practice and culture of consumerism, the economy of
the car society, the structure of our cities, our societal
relations to nature, without impacting on the capitalist
mode of production as such, just reproduce its inherent
contradictions (e.g. the dangers of a ›green‹ financial
bubble, according to Susan George; Janszen 2008). 
In view of the challenges of the tasks ahead, rapidly
overcoming the world economic crisis and the even
greater task of reducing greenhouse emissions of indu-
strial states by 80 per cent or more before 2050, which
means catapulting the entire economy from the fossil
fuel based age of more than 150 years to a solar future
within three decades, this will not be possible without
great disruptions and crises. This time pressure leads to
decision-making problems between a thorough conver-
sion which means destruction of old sectors and capital,
including the risk of economic crises, or a conversion
which is too slow, thereby aggravating environmental
and socio-economical crisis effects. Furthermore, the
valorization of nature and ecological measures leads to
a restriction of possible solutions to the crisis by con-
centrating on further marketization, more growth,
increased resource consumption and simultaneously to
the neglect of non-profit areas.
Varieties and Competition in Post-
Neoliberalisms
The Washington Consensus had already been de-legiti-
mized before the crisis, and will have disappeared after
the crisis. Neither the USA or Europe can determine the
rules any longer, nor is there a visible transnational
consensus. The South American countries as well as
the BRIC states have too obviously been looking for
different ›post-neoliberal‹ forms of integration into the
world market and of economic and social policies.
Strong social movements in South America have topp-
led governments, brought centre-left governments to
power, established approaches to participative policies
and solidarity economies, and indigenous movements
have enforced another way of dealing with representati-
on, state and property. These initiatives have been ack-
nowledged in different and contradictory ways by the
governments concerned: by Venezuela's Oil Socialism
of the 21st century, through to the left state projects
strongly supported by the indigenous populations in
Bolivia and Ecuador, and the left-social democratic pro-
ject of Lula and Kirchner, etc. In different ways they all
rely – despite stronger orientation towards export – on
shifting internal power relations, with more participati-
on, progressive reforms and stronger social redistributi-
on policies that partially expand the subalterns’ capaci-
ty to act (Handlungsfähigkeit) – even if the problems of
inequality, poverty and limited possibilities for develop-
ment of the people persist. 
Powerful movements have also formed in India: move-
ments of peasants', the landless, Dalits, and global soci-
al justice networks. However, they are not linked to a
left state project, apart from very contradictory experi-
ences in the regions controlled by Maoist groups or in
communist-ruled states like Kerala. Nevertheless, the
state has a different role in India's high-tech mixed eco-
nomy in comparison with the neoliberalism of the US 
or Europe. China's state capitalism or the Gulf States
with their public investment policies – practically top
down – are even more clearly trying to bring capitalist
dynamics and state-controlled development with selec-
tive market access into a different relation, and thus
determine the future of the country (more) autonomous-
ly. Even in Scandinavia, different approaches of another
type of capitalism have developed despite neoliberal
hegemony. This kind of capitalism has not only rejected
the trend towards liberalisation, it is moreover extra-
ordinarily successful on the world market.Yet, it has
simultaneously achieved higher labour and social
standards. There is a stronger focus on public and soci-
al infrastructure, education and state intervention than
elsewhere and this guarantees a still higher standard of
living for large sectors of the population. The Scandina-
vian experiences should be considered – even critically
– in view of ›post-neoliberal‹ reforms that can be gene-
ralized in the industrialized countries. 
Internationally, another G20+ was already formed with-
in the WTO framework some years ago, as a loose co-
3 A ›solution‹ is not even intended: the general aim of the G8
to restrict the rise in global temperature to a tolerable level of
2 degrees means accepting 40 to 60 million victims in Africa
alone, according to the Stern Report – “victims of minor economic
value“ (Kaufmann 2008, 2).
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termeasure to the bargaining power of Europe, the US
and Japan and thus strengthening the position of the
›Global South‹. After the collapse of the WTO negotia-
tions in Cancun/Mexico in 2003, Brazil, China or South
Africa relied more strongly on so-called South-South
co-operations. They do not want to uncouple themselves
from the world market, but want to autonomously code-
termine the conditions and forms of further integration
of their economies into the world market and at the
same time reduce their dependence on the old capitalist
centres. By diversifying its foreign trade, Brazil, for
instance, was able to reduce the proportion of exports to
the US, the EU and Japan by 12 per cent within just five
years, even though exports to these countries also
increased clearly. This strategy is a shining example for
smaller countries, for instance in Africa, that want to
free themselves from a one-sided dependence on the
EU, the US or the IMF, by cooperating on difference
nevertheless hierachical basis with China or Brazil.
Furthermore, regional integration projects such as
Mercosur or ALBA in Latin America are being pro-
moted as a counterweight to transnational institu-
tions such as the IMF, World Bank or the WTO. Coope-
rations between China, Japan and South Korea or the
Asean States are being strengthened. Regional develop-
ment banks such as the Banco del Sur are being foun-
ded. The transregional institutions are not always 
functioning in every case; especially in Africa the in-
tegration projects practically face insurmountable
obstacles. Nevertheless, successful projects will lead to
further projects.
The world economic crisis and neoliberal deligitmation
promotes the turning away from blind adherence to libe-
ralisation, privatisation and extreme export orientation
as well as the search for alternative paths for develop-
ment. As with all countries with a strong orientation
towards export, the countries mentioned above were
massively affected by the crisis: the decline in global
demand, the fall in prices for raw materials and oil, the
withdrawal of capital by the old capitalist centres, etc.
Increasingly, it will be decisive for these countries to
promote social justice by refocussing on the domestic
economy, unleashing its productive potentials, in de-
veloping them as self-supporting economic factors and
in using – where available – their wealth in resources
and oil for this purpose. This also requires strengthening
the elements of self-organisation, civil society and
democracy – especially in China and Venezuela (or the
Gulf States). The BRIC States and the countries on the
peripheries must link this to policies of food sovereign-
ty, consistent land reforms and ecological re-orientation.
If not, there is a risk of escalating severe social unrest,
whether it be in China, India, South Africa or Bolivia.
At the same time, this re-orientation in government
viewpoints has to occur without confrontation with the
world market-oriented capitalist groups and investors –
the chances for this are not at all bad, considering the
growth prospects of the BRIC states. 
Authoritarianism
The last conjuncture has already been described as aut-
horitarian neoliberalism (Candeias 2004/2009, 412ff):
for some years now, it has been observed that certain
social groups have been increasingly turning to the right
(evangelists in the USA or the radical right-wing in
Europe). The precarisation of labour and of modes of
living and the thinning out of the so-called middle
classes has been linked to further social division and a
return to strict lines of respectability (Bourdieu), autho-
ritarian education concepts, tougher migration policies
and marginalisation. With countries being ruled by
right-wing governments (Austria, France, Italy, the US
under Bush) there are attempts to forge a social consen-
sus between those above and those below through natio-
nalistic appeals (invocations in the Althusserian sense)
with the aim of excluding others, to the detriment of all
kinds of minorities. In foreign policy, imperial policies
such as the “war against terror”, the “clash of cultures“
are linked to strenghened security and control policies.
Repressive measures (violence and judicial persecution)
to compel opponents to conform, as well as social po-
licies (obligation instead of assistance, workfare) are
increasingly being used: soaring policing and “prisonfa-
re” (Wacquant) to ensure their compliance and prevent
social unrest. Growing social tensions and crises en-
force the tendency to confront them with authoritarian
measures and a national chauvinistic consensus or to
contain them militarily at an international level. 
In view of the difficulties in restoring neoliberalism, and
also of the New Public Deal and Green New Deal, espe-
cially with regard to global competition and unimagined
consequences of the crisis, authoritarian trends may
grow in significance – with a simultaneous decline in
the rhetoric about clash of cultures and antiterrorism.
Nevertheless, unhindered imperial appropriation of oil
and resources will remain an essential objective of the
old and new capitalist centres. The unequal distribution
of the unavoidable impacts of the world economic crisis
and the climate crisis on the social classes and groups
leads to an emphasis on security policies by the ›ruling
class‹. “Nobody has any idea how a planet full of slums4
with growing food and energy crises [...] can secure its
4 According to forecasts, half of the world population will be living
in slums within the next 40 years. Today, there are already over a
billion people living in slums.
7very existence” wrote Mike Davis (2008). He assumes
that a selective adaptation will occur, which will allow
the “first class earth inhabitants to continue to lead a
comfortable way of life with permanent abundance in
green oases, securely fenced off, on an otherwise barren
and inhospitable planet”. 
Authoritarianism is certainly not sufficient for a hege-
monic project, since its attractiveness and economic
potential remain limited. The enormous costs of securi-
ty systems, imperial overstretch, and the anticipated
costs of natural catastrophes already stretch budgets at
least as much as the global financial crisis. The possibi-
lities of a new military Keynesianism that could unfold
new dynamics are limited. Equally, environmental dic-
tatorial measures are conceivable only as a trend within
other hegemonic projects or for enclosed spaces/regi-
ons. However, like military Keynesianism or authorita-
rianism in general, they could develop complementary
effects to other projects. These are not desirable de-
velopment trends, and the left must acknowledge them
to oppose them early enough and find emancipatory
answers.
Socialist transformation and revolu-
tionary Realpolitik
A constellation of interregnum will evolve first from the
various tendencies and projects which are developing in
parallel, secondly as a result of the blockage, de- and
re-composition of the power bloc. Meanwhile the crisis
can persist for a long period, perhaps even a decade,
before a hegemonic direction develops out of the com-
petition between the different projects to dissolve the
crisis. This new hegemony will encompass a certain
band width of different paths but the terrain and the
direction of development will be largely determined. 
Therefore, “post-neoliberalism” (see Brand, et al. 2009)
does not characterise a new period of capitalist deve-
lopment. Instead, it is a transition period or interregnum
in which numerous search processes occur and the
future organisation of society is in debate. A new term
must be coined as soon as a hegemonic project becomes
apparent. In my opinion, at the moment there is only
one potentially hegemonic project which can provide
the required resources, accumulation dynamics and
potential for consensus: the Green New Deal, a period
of green capitalism. It is necessary to work on critici-
zing its features now, to intervene effectively with left
positions, and at the same time to develop a “revolu-
tionary Realpolitik”, as Rosa Luxemburg demanded,
towards socialist transformation. Currently, we are still
in a relatively open historical situation where no hege-
monic direction has yet been taken.
When dealing with too simplified concepts of reform
on the level of money circulation, Marx already warned
that it is “impossible” to remove the entanglements and
contradictions resulting from the existence of money as
long as the exchange value remains the social form of
the product. It is necessary to see this clearly in order
to avoid impossible tasks and to recognise the limits
within which money reforms and circulation transfor-
mations can reform the relations of production and the
social relations based on them (MEW 42, 80). Conse-
quently, it is no longer sufficient to only demand an
important and indispensable re-regulation of the finan-
cial markets.5 Even the expansion of accumulation into
new spheres and new sectors of the economy over the
last 30 years has not been sufficient to diminish over-
accumulation significantly. Susan George assumes that
a market-conform and finance-driven green capitalism
would be accompanied by new waves of speculation.
Just like the Chinese or the US model, the German gro-
wth model of ever-increasing exports with stagnant
domestic demand cannot be easily restored. Conse-
quently, more far-reaching projects, including steps
towards a socialist transformation are necessary (exam-
ples in Candeias 2008a) to confront the problem of
over-accumulation and the numerous social crises. 
Public confidence in markets and governments has
clearly suffered, neoliberalism has been discredited and
its dogmas are crumbling. This opens discursive oppor-
tunities for left alternatives in the sense of a revolu-
tionary Realpolitik. However, these opportunities have
hardly been used to date. The left in Europe and abroad
has gained ground from the social crisis in recent
years, but not from the financial crisis. The global soci-
al justice movements which initiated a new cycle of
trans-national struggles at the beginning of the 1990s
and activated the search for new paths of globalisation
appear to have passed their zenith or are themselves in
crisis at the very moment of the crisis of neoliberalism
(see for example, the stagnation or erosion of activism
in Attac). In Europe, the old left socialist or communist
parties in many countries could not benefit from the
5 As far as re-regulation is concerned, the global social justice
movement is furthest advanced on the question of what should be
done (cf. Wahl 2008): from the ending of further liberalisation
plans within, for example, the EU framework, the tightening and
de-privatisation of bank and financial controls, shutdown of tax
havens and off-shore financial centres, to the introduction of stock
exchange transfer taxes (like the Tobin tax) and capital controls, up
to the establishment of an International Clearing Union, and con-
cepts for future-oriented investment programmes or a new UN-
based Bretton Woods agreement that allows global capital and
technology transfers, equalisation of trade balances, promotes
sustainable development and guarantees minimum social and poli-
tical standards.
8difficulties of the parties of the neoliberal bloc: they
were pulled down into the abyss with the social
democrats, or are marginalised, decomposing themsel-
ves. Some smaller countries such as the Netherlands or
Norway are an exception, perhaps – and Germany:
Many hopes of the European left (left parties as well as
movements) refer to the success of the German Left
Party (Die Linke). The understanding of a productive
relation between the party and the movements, of self-
organisation, participation and representation, of civil
society and state is facing unsolved and new questions. 
But considering the intertwined crises processes, as well
as the numerous initiatives pursued by those in charge
to deal with the crisis, we cannot proceed with the old
demands. The demand for more money or simple natio-
nalization will not succeed unless it is given greater
content, for example by a demand for linking bailouts
and economic stimulus packages to ecological conversi-
on, extended participation, expansion of public services,
a ban on dismissals, etc. The connection between the
multiple crises must be emphasised, the connection be-
tween ecologic and economic crises, between all these
crises and the capitalist mode of production and our
way of life. The ruling bloc always tries to separate
these correlations, to deny social conflicts and changes,
to isolate problems and social groups. In addition to
this, the left must find a new strategic position with
regard to the changed situation. This requires far-rea-
ching proposals and imagination together with practical
initial projects that can be initiated from a minority
position. Otherwise, the demands of the left are taken
over by the ruling elite, as often seen before. An inter-
vention in public debate must draw on concepts and per-
spectives. 
Socialization of the investment function: 
Who actually decides on how to use the resources in
society and what work is socially necessary? The mar-
ket has failed as the most efficient mechanism to allo-
cate investment. Although the neoliberal credit and
financial system still accumulates the isolated latent
productive capitals, however, it is no longer able to
direct it into sufficiently productive investment. Instead,
the over-accumulation of capital produces waves of spe-
culative bubbles followed by a destruction of capital
and employment while large sectors of social reproduc-
tion (e.g. education and training, environment, infra-
structure and public services, combating hunger and
poverty, etc.) are increasingly neglected or destroyed by
austerity programmes. Therefore, the investment func-
tion is to be socialized, must become a public duty. 
Re-organisation and expansion of the public sector: Pri-
vatization has proved unsuitable as an efficient form of
providing public goods and services. It caused the
reduction of public employment, the transformation of
regular employment into precarious employment
inflated the cost of necessary public services from pre-
viously affordable levels, restricted social rights and
democratic decision-making (cf. Candeias/Rilling/Weise
2009). It is necessary to expand the physical and social
infrastructure to counter the crisis of reproduction.
Public employment must be increased to contribute to
the de-precarisation of the workers and the unemployed. 
Radical Ecologisation: The private sector has failed in
ecological conversion of production and providing of
employment security, especially with regard to the
transport and energy sector. Consequently, a radical
ecologisation of the mode of production and the way of
life is not achieved by commodifying and privatising
natural resources. Instead, a preservation of the general
and public character of the natural commons and other
basic reproductive conditions (public goods) is neces-
sary, as well as the expansion of collective free or low
priced public services (for example, expansion of free
public transport systems instead of subsidising the car
industries). 
Solidarity Care Economy: Complaints have been wide-
ly made about the poor state of education, the lack of
kindergardens, increasing poverty and ecological degra-
dation. Nevertheless, things have only become worse
over decades. The reorientation towards the expansion
of the public sector with regard to health, education and
training, research, social services, care, environmental
protection, etc., as mentioned above, is also a contribu-
tion to an ecologisation of our mode of production
(since working with people, caring, and preserving
nature does little ecological damage). This reorientation
also counters the crises in employment and reproduc-
tion, de-commodifying these and pushing back market
forces. This contributes to the emancipative rearrange-
ment of gender relations by focussing on reproductive
functions. The orientation towards the domestic market,
6 In 2007 and 2008, the German Left Party heatedly was discussing
whether a 20 billion investment programme made sense or
whether budget discipline was more important and there were dis-
putes in Attac concerning regulation concepts. Now it is the neoli-
berals who no longer want to be neoliberal, and have, so to say, by-
passed and overtaken the left. The left is unable, neither
rhetorically nor practically, to quickly react to the ruling bloc now
overthrowing all of the old beliefs: monetary austerity and high
interest policies – passé, the stability pact and the Maastricht cri-
teria – not so important, the nationalisation of risks and banks –
why not?, and debt guarantees higher than national budgets – lets
do it, huge stimulus packages – how huge should they be?, a new
Bretton Woods, or at least a European economic government –
about time!, nationalisation of key industries – was that not socia-
list in some way? The rulers present themselves as critics of capi-
talism and courageous rescuers, and gather a population anxious
about job and asset losses around themselves and preach a global,
social market economy or even the Green New Deal.
9regionalisation and a partial trend to de-globalisation
will contribute to reduce the fixation on exports and
equalize trade and current account balances. 
Public social insurance and global social rights: The
neoliberals preached that the public pension fund
system is inefficient and expensive; consequently it was
necessary, according to them, to switch to private pen-
sion schemes (Riester pension scheme in Germany).
However, the pension fund losses in the US due to the
current crisis are even higher than at the time of the
Enron scandal and the New Economy crash. In any
case, in Germany, only a minority relies on private
provisions for old age, and the euphoria concerning
popular shares, such as those of Telekom (German tele-
communications) or Deutsche Bahn (German train ser-
vices), has long since vanished. What is needed is a
rescue package with a new solidarity public social in-
surance for all instead of private individual provisions,
with a comprehensive concept of a Social Europe and
transnational social rights beyond the national frame-
work.
Democratization of the state: The expansion of the pub-
lic sector must simultaneously be accompanied by a
participative transformation of state structures. Neither
a well-intentioned paternalistic and patriarchal Fordist
welfare state, nor an authoritarian state socialism, and
certainly not a neoliberal reorganization of public servi-
ces (based on competition and pure economic efficien-
cy) were particularly emancipative. Consequently, a left
state project must expand participation and transparen-
cy (to finally absorb the state into civil society, as
Gramsci wrote). Decisions on budgets and finance must
be more strongly democratized, real participative bud-
gets are a possible approach. The crisis of political
representation has much to do with the fact that essenti-
al needs of the population are not considered and that
there is no opportunity for individuals to participate in
political decision making. Consequently, a new compre-
hension and distribution of what we consider as social-
ly necessary work is essential – not by increasingly
expanding wage labour, but instead, by expanding
collective and cooperative, as well as publicly financed
employment, directed towards efficiently contributing
to human development, enriching mutual relations and
not towards producing surplus value. What do we want
to use our social resources for, what do we consider
indispensable basic needs that should be made available
to everyone either free of charge or reasonably priced,
what must be used communally, etc. – this should be
debated and decided commonly in everyday life. 
Democratization of the economy: For years, it has been
said that politics should largely keep out of the eco-
nomy. But doubts about management ›performance‹
and the concept of shareholder value strategies have
grown in view of short-term thinking, manager bonus
scandals, tax frauds, bankruptcies and mass redundan-
cies. Even the classic German workers' co-determinati-
on could not sufficiently withstand the pressure of trans-
national competition and finance-driven control, and
sometimes itself became involved in collaboration and
corruption. The redistribution of wealth towards busi-
ness and the wealthy in the course of stagnating (or fal-
ling) real wages and social benefits has promoted an
enormous over-accumulation, which led to the financial
crisis. Thus, it is time for a democratization of the eco-
nomy that goes further than classical workers' co-deter-
mination towards genuine participation by workers,
unions, public consumers and other stakeholders in
company decision making (concerning the whole trans-
national production chain). The goal is to displace the
capitalist boards of directors with collective boards of
directors on company, regional, transnational and other
levels (cf. Wolf 2009). This is also important because
uncertainty and short-termism as well as deficient parti-
cipation of the existing relations of production impede
the productivity, creativity and development of indivi-
duals, of productive forces, and thus of society as a
whole. 
The depth of the crisis and the conflict over ways to
overcome it will determine the next years. It marks a
historical break in capitalist development. Therefore,
within the framework of revolutionary Realpolitik, it
concerns the whole societal organisation, the common
disposition about the immediate conditions of life. This
orientation towards the whole of the social structure is
more than just a long term objective, it is an essential
element to prevent the restriction or the relapse into cor-
poratist interests (that is group interests in a narrow
sense) or towards single reforms which regularly inten-
sify subalternity, what is always the case when struggles
are not seen as hegemonic conflicts over the whole
mode of social organisation. Then what happens is the
integration of partial interests into the ruling power bloc
by compromise. This is also difficult to avoid. However,
conditions for at least partial steps to the left are favou-
rable in these times, since the active consensus is eroded
and splits between groups in the ruling power bloc
impede or reduce their capacity to act. The search for
new social coalitions has started. Given the circum-
stances this is an opportunity and at the same time
an especially difficult and dangerous moment for left
forces.
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